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IV

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the First
Circuit Court, Cache County Division, upon a jury verdict of
guilty of the Logan City ordinance school zone speeding
offense.

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal under

Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c) U.C.A. 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is Michael Thatcher not guilty of the offense

because Logan City is bound by the law in Case No. 880451-CA
which holds that the forms and practices in the apprehension
and prosecution in this case are in direct conflict with
Utah Statutory requirements and also constitute criminal
prosecutorial practices denying due process?
2.

Is Michael Thatcher not guilty of speeding in a

school zone because the so-called school zone is a speed
trap totally ultra vires of the Logan City ordinance and
State Statutes because it is more than a city block distant
from any school or school grounds and because no school or
other pedestrian hazards existed?
3.

Aside from the law of the Case (Issue 1 paragraph

1, supra), is Michael Thatcher not guilty of speeding in a
school zone because Logan City and the Circuit Court denied
due process

in employing

forms

and practices

in his

apprehension and prosecution which were not only in direct
conflict

with

Utah

statutory
1

requirements

for

those

proceedings but also constituted

criminal ultra vires

prosecutorial practices denying due process?
4.

Does Sec. 77-7-18 - 21 deny due process because it

prescribes

citation contents designed to unfairly extort

bail forfeitures and fines and because of facial threats of
indiscriminate warrant issuance because of vagueness and
because it authorizes judicial process terms to describe the
citation?
RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
(All Utah Code Annotated 1953 references are underlined,
i.e. "41-6-46" without other designation.
Utah State Statutes - Speeding
Utah Enabling Statute
41-6-46. Speed regulations—Safe and appropriate speeds
at certain locations—Prima facie speed limits—Emergency
power of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the
conditions and having regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing, including, but not limited to
when:
(a - d omitted)
(e) special hazards exist with respect to
pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of
weather or highway conditions.
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to
Subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the
following speeds are lawful.
Any speed in excess of
these limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is
not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful:
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a school
building or it grounds during school recess or
while children are going to or leaving school
during opening or closing hours, except that local
authorities may reguire a complete stop before
passing a school building or grounds at any of
these periods.
2

(b and c and 3 omitted)

(Bold face emphasis added)

41-6-16,
Provisions of act uniform throughout state—
Local regulations.
The provisions of this act shall be applicable and
uniform throughout this state and in all political
subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation
in conflict with the provisions of this act unless
expressly authorized herein.
Local authorities may,
however, adopt regulations consistent with this act, and
additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict
therewith.
10-3-701. Legislative power exercised by ordinance.
Except as otherwise specifically provided, the governing
body of each municipality shall exercise its legislative
powers through ordinances. (Bold Face emphasis added)
Logan City Speeding Ordinance
42-7-1.
Speed Regulations--Maximum
Speeds--School
Buildings—Intersections, Crossing, and Curves.
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and
having regard to the actual and potential hazards then
existing. In every event speed shall be so controlled as
may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person,
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway
in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all
persons to use due care.
(1)
Twenty miles per hours when passing a school
building or grounds thereof during school
recess or while children are going to or
leaving school during opening and closing
hours.
(2 and 3 omitted)
(4)
40 m.p.h. on the following streets:
400 North - Between Main Street and 1200 East
(Others omitted under 4)
(5 and 6 omitted) (Bold face emphasis added)
76-8-512.
Impersonation of officer.
A person is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he impersonates a
public servant or a peace officer with intent to
deceive another or with intent to induce another to
submit to his pretended official authority or to rely
upon his pretended official act.

3

76-8-513.
False judicial or official notice.
A
person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who, with a
purpose to procure the compliance of another with a
reguest made by the person, knowingly sends, mails,
or delivers to the person a notice or other writing
which has no judicial or other sanction but which in
its format or appearance simulates a summons,
complaint, court order, or process, or an insignia,
seal, or printed form of a federal, state, or local
government or an instrumentality thereof, or is
otherwise calculated to induce a belief that it does
have a judicial or other official sanction.
Criminal Procedural Rules
77-35-1.
Rule 1 - General provisions.
(a) This
chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure."
(b) These rules shall govern the procedure in all
criminal cases in the courts of this state except
juvenile court cases. These rules are intended and
shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure,
fairness in administration, and the elimination of
unnecessary expense and delay. (Subsection (c)
omitted)
77-35-3.
Rule 3 — Service and filing of papers.
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall
be filed with the court and served on all other
parties. (Subsection (b) and (c) omitted)
77-35-4. Rule 4 — Prosecution of public offenses.
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a
person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted
by using the name given to the offense by common law
or by statute or by stating in concise terms the
definition of the offense sufficient to give the
defendant notice of the charge
77-35-5.
Rule 5 — Information and indictment, (a)
Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions
whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall
be commenced by the filing of an information or the
return of an indictment. Prosecution by information
shall be commenced before a magistrate having
jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been
4

committed unless otherwise
(Subsection (b) omitted)

provided

by

law.

77-35-6. Rule 6 — Warrant of arrest or summons, (a)
Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a
summons for the appearance of the accused.
Upon the filing of an information, "if" it appears
from the information, or from any affidavit filed
with the information, that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that
the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a
summons for the appearance of the accused.
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the
accused will appear on a summons and there is no
substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or
injury to persons or property, or danger to the
community, a summons may issue in lieu of a warrant
of arrest to require the appearance of the
accused....
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace
officer.
The summons may be served by a peace
officer or any person authorized to serve a summons
in a civil action.
77-35-7. Rule 7 — Proceedings before magistrate, (a)
(1) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of
arrest, the defendant shall appear before the court
as directed in the summons.
(Subsections (a)(2) (f) omitted)
Citation Enabling Statutes
77-7-18.
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction
charge. A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person
into custody, or any public official of any county or
municipality charged with the enforcement of the law,
may issue and deliver a citation reguiring any person
subject to arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or
infraction charge to appear at the court of the
magistrate before whom the person should be taken
pursuant to law if the person had been arrested.
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation—Arrest for
failure to appear--Collection of bail amounts by
Office
of
Recovery
Services--Motor
vehicle
violations—Disposition of fines and costs.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall
appear before the magistrate designated in the
5

citation on or before the time and date specified in
the citation.
(2) No citation shall reguire a person to appear
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following
its issuance.
(3) Any person who receives a citation and who
fails to appear on or before the time and date and at
the court specified shall be subject to arrest. The
magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest and may
order the Office of Recovery Services, within the
Department of Social Services, to enforce collection
of any bail amounts ordered by the court
(4)
Except where otherwise provided by law,
citations or informations, issued for violations of
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall state that
the person receiving the citation or information
shall appear before the magistrate nearest and most
accessible to the place of violation who has
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
If the
citation or information
is issued for a
violation within the geographical boundaries of any
municipality or county precinct in which a justice
court exists and in which a justice of the peace is
currently serving, such court shall be deemed the
nearest most accessible magistrate before whom such
person
shall appear; provided, however, that
consistent with Section 78-4-5, informations or
citations issued
(6) It shall be the duty of
clerks and other administrative personnel serving the
circuit, juvenile, and justice courts to ensure that
all citations for violation of Title 41, Utah Code
Annotated 195 3, are filed properly in accordance with
the foregoing subsection and to refuse to receive
citations that should be filed in another court
77-7-20, Service of citation on defendant—Filing in
court—Contents of citations.
(1) If a citation is
issued pursuant to section 77-7-18, the peace officer
or public official shall issue one copy to the person
cited and shall within five days file a duplicate
copy with the court specified in the citation.
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under
authority of this chapter shall contain:
(a) The name of the court before which the person
is to appear;
(b) The name of the person cited;
(c) A brief description of the offense charged;
(d) The date, time and place at which the offense
is alleged to have occurred;
(e) The date on which the citation was issued;
6

(f) The name of the peace officer or public
official who issued the citation, and the name of the
arresting person if an arrest was made by a private
party and the citation was issued in lieu of taking
the arrested person before a magistrate;
(g) The time and date on or before and after which
the person is to appear;
(h) The address of the court in which the person is
to appear;
(i) A certification above the signature of the
officer issuing the citation in substantially the
following language:
"I certify that a copy of this
citation or information (Summons and Complaint) was
duly served upon the defendant according to law on
the above date and I know or believe and so allege
that the above-named defendant did commit the offense
herein set forth contrary to law. I further certify
that the court to which the defendant has been
directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to
section 77-7-21."; and
(j) A notice containing substantially the following
language;
READ CAREFULLY
This citation is not an information and will not be
used as an information without your consent.
If an
information is filed you will be provided a copy by
the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the
time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN
INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST.
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation—Voluntary forfeiture
of bail—Information when required.
(1) Whenever a
citation is issued pursuant to the provisions of
section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation filed with
the magistrate may be used in lieu of an information
to which the person cited may plead guilty or no
contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be
forfeited.
With the magistrate's approval a person
may voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being
required in any case of a class B misdemeanor or
less.
Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be
entered as a conviction and treated the same as if
the accused pleaded guilty.
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear
before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued
under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or
before the date set for his appearance, an
information shall be filed and proceedings held in
7

accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
all other applicable provisions of this code, which
information shall be deemed an original pleading;
provided, however, that the person cited may by
written agreement waive the filing of the information
and thereafter the prosecution may proceed on the
citation notwithstanding any provisions to the
contrary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This de facto criminal action for the offense of
speeding in a pre-textual and wholly ultra vires speed trap
"school zone" was commenced in and on 400 North Street U.S.
Highway 89 in Logan, Utah on December 16, 1988 by a city
police officer while impersonating an officer of the Circuit
Court by delivering to Thatcher a false Circuit Court
judicial notice with numerous ultra vires fear engendering
judicial titles and threats under a Circuit Court case
number, captions and headings.

A materially varied copy of

the false judicial notice was filed by the policeman with
the

Circuit

Court

under

the

pretext

that

it

was

a

"citation."
The Circuit Court, acting on the strength of the
pretextual

"citation" false judicial notice, issued a

Delinguent Notice and mailed the same to Michael Thatcher
after he inadvertently failed to appear within the time
fixed.

The court in the notice threatened Thatcher with the

issuance of a warrant on January 30, 1989 unless he paid the
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fixed bail of $80.00 before that date.

He paid the bail of

$80.00, entered the plea of not guilty, and demanded a jury
trial.

Following his plea of not guilty to the false

judicial notice on the 7th day of February, 1989, an
information was filed.
1989.

A jury trial was held on March 2,

Plaintiff moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was

the law of the Karen Thatcher case and otherwise the law
that the false judicial notice "tickets" denied due process
and was a complete defense.
The

judge

received

the Karen

Thatcher

Brief

and

decision in evidence and denied the motion to dismiss and
excluded relevant evidence regarding the false judicial
notice.

At the close of the city's evidence a motion to

dismiss and for a directed verdict was added on the grounds
that 33 miles per hour was a legal speed at that time and
place.

The judge denied the motion.

to the jury.

The case was submitted

Within a very few minutes after deliberations

began the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

Time for

sentencing was waived, a fine was imposed and sentence
suspended on condition of fine payment.
herein

was

filed

on

the

27th

day

A notice of appeal
of

March

1989.

Statement of Facts
On December 16, 1988 Michael Thatcher was a 21 year old
single student at Utah State University living at home in
the Young Ward community west of Logan.
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He was driving his

car to Utah State University going east on Logan's Fourth
North

street, four

lane U.S. Highway

89

and

the

main

highway from downtown Logan to USU, to Logan Canyon and to
interstate points north and east.
pg.

1).

The

posted

speed

(Tr. pg. 88 - 89, Add.

limit

and

the

speed

limit

expressly fixed by Logan City ordinance for said highway was
40 miles per hour.

(Tr. pg. 55, Add. pg. 9 ) .

As he was

proceeding east at 33 miles per hour he was stopped by a
Logan City police officer and was
judicial notice.

served with

a

false

(Tr. pg. 53 and Add. Pgs. 2, 3 & 4 ) .

The

"ticket" had a Circuit Court heading and case number and was
variously

designated

as

a

"Summons,"

"Information,"

"Affidavit" charging him with exceeding a 20 m.p.h. speed
limit in a school zone

(Add. pgs. 2, 3 & 4 ) .

The Logan

City police department had established the zones by signs
and blinking yellow lights as a 20 mile per hour school zone
(Tr.

Pg.

48).

The

zone was

ultra

vires

of

two

city

ordinances and the state statute because it was more than a
block from the Adams Elementary School and grounds (Add. pg.
1).

There were

no pedestrians

visible

from the

highway

within the so called "school zone" at the time (Tr. pg. 58).
The nearest school or school grounds was located a full city
block north of the Fourth North U.S. 89 ultra vires school
zone

(Add. Pg.

1).

The

State

statute

and

Logan

City

ordinance authorizes 20 miles per hour school zones only in
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"passing a school building or grounds thereof"
and 41-6-46).

(Add. Pg. 9

Another part of the same Logan City ordinance

expressly provides a 40 miles per hour speed limit on Fourth
North U.S. Highway 89 from Main Street Logan east to 1200
East which includes the ultra vires speed trap (Add. Pg. 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This "school zone" speed trap was ultra vires of State
law and the City ordinance and there were no pedestrian
hazards.

The use by the police and the Court of a false

judicial notice in lieu of a "citation" ignores the law of
an earlier case and denies due process.

The Utah "citation"

enabling act is unconstitutional on multiple grounds.
The police department has established

an 20 m.p.h.

ultra vires school zone speed trap in a 40 m.p.h. zone over
a block away from any school or grounds (Add. Pg. 1 Map).
The State statute and a City ordinance expressly limit
school zones to roads passing by "a school or its grounds."
The same city ordinance expressly fixed the speed limit at
40 miles per hour on this major highway.

In addition there

were no school or other pedestrian hazards at the time.
The absurdity

of

the

ultra

vires

speed

trap

is

compounded by the use of extra-legal ticket forms by the
police and court.

Rather than employing a legal "citation,"

the police officer serves false judicial notice under
circuit court numbered heading falsely entitled a "Summons,"
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"Information," and "Affidavit."

(Add. Pg. 2, 3 & 4).

Logan

City and the Circuit Court have continued this illicit form
practice in open hostility to the law and in contempt of a
previous Court of Appeals case judgment and decision on this
matter in which the City defaulted in brief filing and oral
argument.
Utah's "citation" enabling statute violates due process
by

authorizing

use

in

citations

of

false

judicial

designations such as "information," "Summons and Complaint,"
and threats of indiscriminate issuance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE GESTAPO STYLE SPEED
TRAP, LONG ESTABLISHED BY THE CITY POLICE ON
A MAIN HIGHWAY IN OPEN HOSTILITY TO BOTH ITS
OWN ORDINANCES AND LIMITING STATE STATUTES IS
A PRACTICE IN OUTRAGEOUS VIOLATION OF DUE
PROCESS.
If it were not for the fact that these kinds of

outrageous ultra vires official practices are the accepted
and expected norm in Cache County local governments, this
argument would appear to be so obvious as to be an affront
to this Honorable Court.

This case again raises the

rhetorical guestion as to what kind of cumulative proof it
will take for the appellate courts of Utah to recognize and
deal forthrightly and effectively with the reality that in
Cache County

"they" have developed highly popular and

officially mandated forms of de facto local governance which
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are openly hostile to the rule of constitutional law and the
state appellate jurisprudence, including hostility to the
law of specific cases.
The relevant facts are clearly established by the
official Logan City Map attached as Addendum page 1 infra.
The subject "school zone" is U.S. 89 on Fourth North between
Third East and Fifth East.

The school and grounds pretext

for the "school zone" is Adams Elementary School and its
Adams Park grounds occupying the full city block from Fifth
North to Sixth North and from Fourth East to Fifth East.
The only streets gualifying for the 20 m.p.h. school zone in
the Adams school area are those surrounding that block and
no others.

U.S. 89 Fourth North is a full block further

south than the authorized school zone between Fifth and
Sixth North Streets (Add. pg. 1).
The Logan City school zone ordinance Thatcher was cited
and charged with violating was 42-7-1 (a)(1) which expressly
limits the zone to "when passing a school building or
grounds thereof"

(Add. pg. 8 & 9). A later subsection of

that same ordinance, 42-7-1 (a)(4), in designating 40 m.p.h.
speed zones first designates this very stretch of U.S. 89 on
Fourth North from Main Street to Twelfth East as a 40 m.p.h.
zone.
The ordinance limitation on school zones to streets
adjacent to "schools and grounds" is expressly imposed upon

13

municipal authorities by the state legislature in 41-6-46
(2)(a) and 41-6-16.

These local speed traps remote from

hazards on highways, imposed to raise local revenues would
be perhaps

the

classical

legislature by 41-6-16.

evil

targeted

by

the

state

The State legislature obviously

mandated this protection to the public from the well-known
propensity of local legislative bodies, police and courts to
establishing speed traps for revenue raising purposes on
main highways under the pretext of "school zones" regardless
of the proximity of the "trap" to the primary school zone
hazards.
The City police have, by setting up this illegal trap,
violated the clear mandate of the sovereign state of Utah
and its own municipal

legislature

for the purpose of

extracting property in the form of illicit fine, bail money,
etc. as an entrenched unconstitutional practice.
Even if arguendo, this had been a properly designated
20 m.p.h. school zone, the 33 m.p.h. would have been lawful
because there were no school or other pedestrian traffic
hazards within the view of the two policemen.

One policeman

was sitting in her parked pick-up looking for pedestrians to
escort them across the highways with a hand-written stop
sign.

She testified that there were none (Tr. pg. 77 and

80) .
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The

State

statute

41-6-46

(1) and

(2) and

City

Ordinance 41-6-46 make it very clear that even the 20 m.p.h.
limit is only prima facie.

It may be overcome by evidence

as in this case where the two policemen and Thatcher all
concurred that there were in fact at that time no observable
school or other pedestrians in sight.
This local sovereign police violation of the State and
City legislative limitations on the police authority is one
of the clearest violations of due process of law.
The sum of the due process violations is incredible in
this case:
"In general, when the sovereign has established
rules to govern its own conduct, it will be held
to the self-imposed limitation on its own
authority, departure from which denies due
process of law."
This citation is from 16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 969 pgs.
265 & 266 citing Layton v. Swapp, D. C. Utah 484 F. Supp.
958, above which is noted:
"Implicit in concept of due process are ideas
that government must follow its own rules and
that it must do so within reasonable time."
The

compulsory

nondiscretionary

nature

of

the

sovereign's duty to follow its own rules is highlighted by a
continuation of the same C.J.S. citation at page 266.
"and where a state has established procedure
which comports with due process, state and local
officials are bound to follow those procedures."
(Citing Wold v. Lillie v. Kenosha County
Sheriff, D.C. Wis., 504 F. Supp. 1 vacated on
other grounds C.A.)
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This

locally

popular

notion

that

the

police

can

establish school zones wherever they think there is a hazard
and that rules are to be interpreted for the convenience and
efficiency

of the

sovereign

or its

favored

patrons

is

dispelled with finality by the case of Deseret Savings Bank
vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923) and guoting from
Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 as follows:
"The conclusion to be deduced from the
authorities is that, where power is given to
public officers, in the language of the act
before us, or in equivalent language -- whenever
the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise -- the language***though
permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What
they are empowered to do for a third person the
law requires shall be done. The power is given,
not for their benefit, but for his.
It is
placed with the depositary to meet the demands
of right, and to prevent a failure of justice.
It is given as a remedy to those entitled to
invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be
remediless.
"In all such cases it is held that the
intent***which is the test, was not to devolve a
mere discretion, but to impose 'a positive and
absolute duty.'"
II.

IT IS A DUE PROCESS DEFENSE THAT THESE CITY
POLICE
"TICKETS" ARE ULTRA VIRES OF THE
"CITATION" STATUTE AND CLASS B MISDEMEANORS.
THEIR SERVICE IS FALSE IMPERSONATION, THE FORM
IS A FALSE JUDICIAL NOTICE. THE DEFAULTING CITY
AND CIRCUIT COURT HAVE "THUMBED THEIR NOSES" AT
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN CASE NO. 880451-CA ON
THIS VERY ISSUE.

The "ticket" forms employed by the City (Add. pgs. 2, 3 &
4) clearly and outrageously exceed the permitted wording for
"citations" under 77-7-10.

The "citations" used in the same

Circuit Court by the Highway Patrol (Add. pg. 6) and Cache
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Sheriff's Office (Add. pg. 5 ) , by contrast appear to be a
good faith attempt to conform to 77-7-10.

It is obvious on

the other hand that in the signing and delivering of the
"SUMMONS,"

(etc.) ticket the policeman is impersonating a

summons-issuing
committing
officer

officer

of

the

a Class B misdemeanor

under

76-8-512

and

First
of

Circuit

Court,

impersonation

committing

another

of

an

Class

B

misdemeanor of false judicial notice under 76-8-513.
The ruling of the Circuit Court, excluding due process
denial

evidence

at

the

jury

trial

denied

Defendant's

fundamental due process right to present all his defenses to
the jury. Thatcher clearly has reguired standing:
"...The accused may challenge the validity of...
practice, or policy involved in the course of
criminal prosecution:" (16 C.J.S. Con. Law Sec.
73 pg. 201 & 202.
Citing Berger vs. State of
New York, N. Y., 87 S.Ct. 1873, 388 U.S. 41, 18
L.Ed. 2d 1040.)
Here the false judicial notice and false impersonation
were

the basis

for

the

prosecution

and

extraction

of

property in the form of an $80.00 fine.
"...The accused must show that his rights are
adversely affected by it... (practice being
challenged), whether or not it is the basis for
the prosecution and such a showing is sufficient
to support standing. (U.S. Groppi v. Wisconsin,
91 S.Ct. 490) (16 C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 pg.
233)
The

ultra

vires

practices

here

aforesaid private rights protective

all

violated

the

state statutes

and

inherently constitute a violation of due process.
17

"Due process may be effected by compliance as
well as by non-compliance with a statute... or
that the law (has) not been observed..."
(16C
C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 pg. 233)
The ultra vires practices employed here were calculated
to thwart rather than fulfill the legitimate purposes of the
law.

At a minimum

degree

of

culpability,

the police,

prosecutorial and court practices were in reckless disregard
of the statutory procedural rights of citizens in general,
and Thatcher.
"The due process clauses require that a power
conferred by law be exercised judiciously with
an honest intent to fulfill the purpose of the
law and it is a part of the judicial function to
see that the requirement is met..." (16C C.J.S.
Con. Law Sec. 967 pg. 254)
The very most

rigid

standards

of

due process

are

applicable to criminal proceedings in general.
"In criminal matters, due process requirements
must be rigidly adhered to. Whether defendant's
constitutional right to due process of law has
been infringed in a criminal prosecution will be
determined on the particular facts of each case,
but any substantial doubt as to a possible
deprivation of due process of law must be
resolved in favor of defendant."
(16C C.J.S.
Con. Law Sec. 992 pg. 350 & 351)
The

ultra

vires

practices

and

standard

ultra

vires

forms employed in this scheme are so far in violation of the
legal protections and requirements that it appears there was
a

calculated

long-standing plan with the very purpose of

short cutting every
process.

legal and statutory protection

and

The City's objective was to extort fines by unfair
18

and illegal scare tactics.

The whole plan appears to have

been so outrageous as to be unbelievable, thus making it
difficult to retain credibility and present the outrageous
facts as they are.

The triggering mechanism for the scheme

are police officers who have been lead to believe that they
have the power on the street of Logan to there commence a
criminal action by their issuing and

serving a false

judicial notice "SUMMONS," "INFORMATION," under a Circuit
Court number and with a Circuit Court heading (Add. pg. 2, 3
& 4) .
The simplest, most basic concepts of separation of
powers dictate what is statutorily established in 77-35-1-7.
A police officer belongs to the executive branch and has no
power to issue Summons, though he may serve the same.

The

criminal action must be first commenced by the filing of an
information with the magistrate before any criminal action
is commenced or summons issued.

The unbelievability of what

was happening under the practice is identified by the fact
that the Highway Patrol and Cache County Sheriff's Office,
operating in the same community and through the same court
and under the same State enabling legislation, avoided any
claims to Summons issuance powers or any suggestion that
they are "Court" officers or that there is a court number
(See Add. pg. 5 & 6).

These open and notorious claims of

police to judicial powers constitute a classic case of
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impersonation of a judicial officer calculated to induce
others

to

submit

to

pretended

official

authority

in

violation of 76-8-512.
The most cursory examination of the tainted Logan City
ticket, especially when compared with the Highway Patrol and
Cache County Sheriff's form, exposes the most blatant
possible violation of 77-8-513 prohibiting delivery of a
false judicial notice.

The Highway Patrol form and Cache

County sheriff's "citation" forms never once characterizes
the citation as a Summons.

Logan City's tainted ticket, on

the other hand, among other judicial titles, characterizes
itself as a Summons in the caption, twice in red bold type
on the front of the ticket and in two places on the back.
Court headings and captions are carefully avoided on the
Highway Patrol and Cache sheriff's citation forms.

The

Logan City form, however, has a detailed and complete
circuit court title in the format prescribed

for formal

pleadings of the circuit court and in the caption has a
number (No. C-1875) where case numbers are reguired in
formal court pleadings.

It is obviously calculated to give

the appearance that the violator

is a defendant

criminal case properly and legally filed in that court.

in a
The

large number in the caption under the court heading is
obviously calculated to further instill the fear that the
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case has already been court docketed and that some fearful,
but unspecified court action has already been taken.
While the third point hereafter deals with the claim to
unconstitutionality of the citation enabling act because it
permits the use of the word "information," it is clear that
the Logan City form exceeds even that apparent authorization
in incredible proportions.

The top heading of the "COURT

COPY" bearing Thatcher's original signature designates the
ticket as an "INFORMATION-AFFIDAVIT" under the Circuit Court
heading (Add. pg 4).
While it is clear that the Logan City ticket is a false
judicial notice under 76-8-513 and exceeds the permitted
verbiage of a citation under 77-7-20 its employment also
constitutes the common law tort of an abuse or malicious
abuse of process.

There can be no doubt that the prohibited

circuit court heading on the ticket and its repeated use of
"Summons," Information and references that it may be the
basis for issuance of a warrant were calculated to extort
payment of fines and forfeiture of bail that could not be
extracted by the use of a legal "citation."
"It has been held that an "abuse" or malicious
abuse" of process is its employment to obtain a
result which the process was not intended by law
to effect. For purposes of this tort and word
process may encompass a range of court
procedures incident to the litigation. The tort
is not limited to the issuance of process, but
extends to its oppressive use after issuance."
(72 C.J.S. Sec. 106 PROCESS pg. 694)
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The most charitable view that one can possibly take of
the state of the collective official minds that led to the
unconscionable property (and liberty) extraction scheme is
that "they" subjectively interpreted their statutory powers
to

provide

the maximum

possible

expedience

to

their

objectives of extracting money from the public. Only the
most "official" self-serving and convoluted interpretation
of statutes could lead to a conclusion of legislative
authority for this conduct.

Such interpretations are the

norm in Cache County local government even when citizens'
property and liberty rights are at stake.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah quoting from the
U.S. Supreme Court has mandated an opposite principal of
interpretation to protect individual rights in Deseret
Savings Bank vs. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923)
quoting from Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419
as follows:
"The conclusion to be deduced from the
authorities is that, where power is given to
public officers, in the language of the act
before us, or in equivalent language -- whenever
the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise -- the language***though
permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. What
they are empowered to do for a third person the
law requires shall be done. The power is given,
not for their benefit, but for his.
It is
placed with the depositary to meet the demands
of right, and to prevent a failure of justice.
It is given as a remedy to those entitled to
invoke its aid, and who would otherwise be
remediless.
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"In all such cases it is held that the
intent***which is the test, was not to devolve a
mere discretion, but to impose 'a positive and
absolute duty.'"
B.

This False Judicial Notice Matter is Res Judicata

as to Logan City and the Circuit Court.
One unquestionable
decision

in

the

case

effect of this Court's
of

Logan

City

v.

unreported

Karen

Thatcher

(Michael's cousin) No. 880451-CA was to declare the "ticket"
form served on Karen an ultra vires "citation" at least as
to Logan City who totally defaulted on that appeal.

The

Appellant's brief and the decision are in the record of this
case beginning at page 22 and is referred to herein as page
numbers

in

"Karen's

Brief."

The

printed

ultra

vires

"ticket" form served on Karen on September 4, 1987 is found
in Karen's Brief Addendum pgs. Al to A5.

The good faith

"citation" forms used by the Highway Patrol and Sheriff's
office are in Karen's Brief pgs. A6 and A7.
The ultra vires ticket served on Michael Thatcher about
fifteen months later on December 16, 1988 is Addendum pgs.
Al, A2 and A3 infra.

A careful comparison shows a reprint

and some changes that fall woefully short of correcting the
false

judicial

notice

character

of

the

former

version

conceded by the City's default in the Karen Thatcher appeal.
It is clear that the

"new" ticket form retained

its

fear engendering appearance as a filed and numbered court
headed

and

captioned

"summons,"
23

"information,"

and

"affidavit."
face

Multiple "SUMMONS" statements remained on the

including

a

large

print

caption

and

red

print

references with two on the reverse side in the body.

Some

former Summons references were changed to "citation."

It is

clear however that the City was intent on retaining and not
relinguishing

whatever

extortive

effect

there

was

in

continuing the false judicial scare of court heading, court
case number, summons-information-affidavit

references.

It

is clear that the City had no intent to return to the use of
a

"citation" in conformity with State law as conceded

in

their default and as evidenced by the concurrent forms used
by the Highway Patrol and Cache Sheriff's office.

This kind

of conduct has every appearance of constituting contempt of
this Court.
These

same

impersonation

false

issues

on

judicial
substantially

notice
similar

and

false

forms

were

matters litigated in the Karen Thatcher case to which Logan
City was

a party

subject

to

this Utah

Court

of

Appeals

decision within the meaning of 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Judgments
Sec. 229 as follows:
Indeed, the first and most obvious consequence
of a judgment is that it establishes an
indisputable obligation, and a final judgment
definitely fixes the rights and liabilities of
the parties in an action as to the matters
submitted to it for decision.
The note cites Adams v. Davies, 107 Utah 579, 156 P.2d.
207 and 158 ALR 852.
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Logan City was a party whose obligation to discontinue
the use of those substantially similar false judicial notice
tickets was

fixed

by

the

City's

default.

The

City

judicially conceded the illegality of the form and practice
in that earlier case.

If this chain of events will not

convince this Court that Logan City's officials and the
Circuit Court have a popular de facto system for governance
which

they

believe

to

be

superior

to

the

rule

of

constitutional law, then exposed unfavored citizens would be
well advised to move to another city (and state).
III. THE CITATION ENABLING ACT IS SO PREJUDICIALLY
MISLEADING AND VAGUE IN DESCRIBING RIGHTS AND
LIABILITIES THAT ALL OR SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THIS MATTER WAS ALSO DECIDED
AGAINST LOGAN CITY IN THE KAREN THATCHER CASE.
A.

A careful analysis of the misdemeanor "citation"

enabling act found in 77-7-18 to 23 and compared with 76-512
& 513 on false impersonation and false judicial notice
crimes, demonstrates the fine line the legislature was
trying to walk.

Their primary objective was to enable (non-

judicial) peace officers maximum public "scare" factor in
inducing uncontested

fine payments and bail forfeitures.

They faced constitutional invalidity should the "citation"
content go over the line in its appearance as either a
"false judicial notice" or create an inordinate and false
fear that a warrant may issue indiscriminately even though
unspecified statutory protective pre-conditions to warrant
25

issuance must first be met under the law.

Under general law

and 76-8-512 & 513 a peace officer could issue a citation or
serve a summons previously issued by a court.

However, he

would be committing two class B misdemeanors if he were to
claim (judicial) authority to "issue" a summons, complaint
or information on the street.
The first citation enabling section, 77-7-18 carefully
avoids

any

judicial

exclusively with
reference

process

"citation."

is to a

terminology

and

However, in 77-7-19

"citation

or

information,"

being a hard judicial process term.

Section

stays
(4) the

the

latter

77-7-20

(i)

confusingly then requires wording that "This citation is not
an "information."

To multiply the confusion, the preceding

sub paragraph (i) classifies the notice as a citation, but
then prescribes a whole

series of alternative

judicial

process terms of reference to the notice:
"I certify that a copy of this citation, or
information (summons or complaint) was duly
served..."
Then the following:
"READ CAREFULLY"
This citation is not an information and will not
be used as an information
Section 77-7-21 compounds the inconsistency by clearly
identifying an "information" as a separate and later process
that may be filed with the Court if specified options are
exercised by the citation recipient.
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The Logan City traffic

ticket

form

is

so clearly

a

false judicial notice that its examination does little to
aid in demonstrating the finite unconstitutional elements in
the citation enabling act (Add. A1-A5).
The Highway Patrol citation form
with the sheriff's form

(Add. A 7 ) , compared

(Add. A6) reveal two

divergent

attempts to walk the fine line between a "citation" and a
false judicial notice under 76-8-513.
The Highway Patrol form excludes anything that may have
the appearance of court captions or jurats that could be
construed

as

indicia of

judicial

process.

The

enabling

statutes do not expressly address these indicia of judicial
process, but the false judicial notice statute
prohibits them.

inherently

The sheriff's form raises a red or gray

flag in this respect by highlighting a notary jurat which
seems

to

have

no

purpose

other

than

to

create

an

unauthorized judicial process scare.
The Sheriff's office titles its ticket form however, as
a

"CITATION

judicial

INFORMATION."

process

This

terminology

authorized by 77-7-20.

clear

appears

This directly

to

incursion
be

into

expressly

conflicts with the

letter and spirit of the false judicial notice statute 77-8513.
In apparent

recognition

of

this

problem

with

the

enabling act and presumably with the aid of the Attorney
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General, the Highway Patrol uses the title of "CITATION" but
not the "information" title as does the Sheriff's form.
The 77-7-20 legislatively authorized citation statement
that, absent a timely appearance, an Information "will be
filed" and that the court "may" issue an arrest warrant is a
grossly misleading scare.

A form of this false judicial

threat is on the reverse side of all three police agency
versions of the tickets.
An honest, straight forward due process reference as to
what may transpire in the judicial processing of a failure
to appear on the ticket would need to contain the following
statements in order not to be materially and prejudicially
misleading to its recipients:
"Informations" may be filed on the offense
charged and on a separate failure to appear
offense if you wilfully fail to appear as
promised.
Thereafter the court will issue a
summons or, may upon finding probable risks of
dangers, in lieu of a summons, issue a warrant
for your arrest."
Anything less is a material misleading scare violating
due process.
the

false

The "will" file an information statement gives
impression

that

there

is

no

prosecutorial

discretion to refuse to prosecute under any circumstances.
The commonly used option to the information filing process
of mailing notices and demands is totally absent.

The

"warrant

the

may

issue"

statement

deceitfully

omits

"summons" process which is the compulsory formal process

following information filing absent a finding based on
evidence of likelihood of the dangers specified in 77-35-6

Ibi.
The insidious
spawned

evil which this misleading

is evident

in what must

legislation

have been hundreds

of

thousands of dollars of fines paid and bail forfeited in
this illicit speed trap in which no one has openly raised
the issue that it is not a 20 m.p.h. school zone.

Logan

City's last 20 years of operation and support of its huge
police
similar

force

substantially

illicit

"tickets."

traps

and

These were

depended
fear

on

this

engendering

all popularly

and

false

supported

other
notice

practices

under their so called better de facto governmental system.
B.

The issue under this Point was raised and briefed

identically in the Karen Thatcher brief Point III pages 38
through 42.
regarding

Point II B supra is incorporated by reference

the

res

judicata

judgment of reversal.
inherently

include

effect

of

the

Karen

Thatcher

The judgment of reversal in that case
a conclusion

that,

at

least

as

to

defaulting Logan City (and Karen Thatcher) the Utah citation
enabling act is unconstitutional.

It would also appear that

Logan City as a defaulting party to the earlier

(related)

appeal should be bound thereby regarding continuing use of
any

false

judicial

notice

"tickets"

on

whomever

served.

There appears to be a direct confrontation in these cases
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between the state level appellate judicial authority of this
Court

and

the

apparent

contempt

of

a

local

court) system that will not be deterred.

police

This de

(and
facto

local governmental system is popularly and openly hostile to
the rule of constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
This Court should not only render a reversal of the
guilty

verdict

but

should

also

stop

the

local

rebellion

against the rule of constitutional law clearly evidenced in
this case.
the

There should be a reported decision establishing

law on all issues raised.

In view

of

the

apparent

contempt shown for the decision of this Court by
Logan City

in the Karen

Thatcher

case, the

Court

should

consider exercising its extraordinary writ power to require
conformity to the law of this case by both Logan City and
the First Circuit Court.
Respectfully submitted

Attorney for Defendant Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 29th day of June, 1989
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
were mailed postage prepaid in Logan, Utah to Scott Barrett,
Barrett and Daines, 108 North Main Street, Logan, Utah
84321.
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I certify that a copy of this Citation or Information was duly served upon the defendant
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ADDRESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE 140 NORTH 1ST WEST, LOGAN, UTAH
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN
NOTICE TO VIOLATOR: READ
BACK OF THIS
SUMMONS
CAREFULLY. BRING SUMMONS
WITH Y O U .
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INSTRUCTIONS — READ CAREFULLY
SIGNING THIS CITATION IS NOT AN ADMISSION OF GUILT. HOWEVER, IF YOU
REFUSE TO SIGN, THE OFFICER MUST TAKE YOU INTO CUSTODY WHERE YOU
MUST POST BAIL BEFORE YOU WILL BE RELEASED.
Before entering Court you must present your copy of tne summons to the Clerk c* the
Court ai which time you wiil be instructed as to wnetner the violation charged may be
disposed of by posting bail or forfeiting bail, if bail can be forfeited to dispose of the
ch?rgeyou may post!he bai! c*. or befc r c the cou r - apr^nrrincc date on yoi>r "urnrrorn
during the regular hours of tne 0 ^ 4 : : s office
if you disagree with the charges or are so instructed by the Clerk you must personally
appear, or by counsel appear, in Circuit Court; at the date and time indicated by the
officer on the summons, and enter a plea of "NOT GUILTY" and a trial date will be set
If you forfeit bail or enter a plea of guilty in Court or are found guilty after a trial, the
forfeiture or conviction will be reported on all moving violations to the State Departmen
of Public Safety, Driver's License Division, and will be recorded against your drivmc
record
This citation is not an information and wiil not be used as an information without your
consent. If an information is filed you will be provided a copy by the court. You MUST
appear in court on or before the date and time set in this summons. IF YOU FAIL TC
APPEAR, AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. FAILURE TO APPEAR as promised on the reverse
side hereof or failure to post bail on or before such appearance date, where forfeitures
are permitted, constitutes a separate and additional offense, a ciass B misdemeanor, for
which the law provides a penalty up to 6 months in jail or $1,000.00 fine or both.

COURT ACTION:

Fine S

Suspended $

davs in County Jail

Delay in execution to the

Trial Date

day of

day of

198

Bail set $

Receipt No.

clr.y-, w ^ K >eno'ed

198

at

• a.m

• p.m

Bail Forfeited

Date

CIRCUIT COURT: 140 NORTH 1ST WEST
Logan. Utah 84321

Amount $

Clerk Office Hours:
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Mondays through Friday
except iegal holidays.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY. UTAH 8432'

CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR
A f H E CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OfS +HE
IN THE n*J.4lClPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUN/r- UTAH 84321

No.C- 1 8 7 5

STATE O f UTAH
COUNTY Of CACHE
CITY Of LOGAN
The undersigned

INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT
being duly sworn upon his ooth deposes ond soys

/~\^i

Nome
'

ia\t

(PI»o*»j>rin»)

f i /

M,ddl«

^

*T&& ( S o

St
City.

C

Age.

t-/

Dnv

Lie No

&A»<*,

*<~*& S?

/

8„^,.

<>y-L/f7'

Sex (^MoTe'

O Femole

_Stole

z, J->~

„ Color

? T^ / 5 l

Upon o public highway namely at (location).

^Vo<^^>

^//^

did unlawfully operate the above described vehicle m the city county and state aforesaid and did
then and there commit the following oHeme
SPEEDING

"5

^

mph

Improper LEFT TURN
Improper RIGHT TURN

•m
5 c
o •

Q

Disobeyed TRAFFIC
CONTROL SIGNAL

in

^ &~

<%"/

/ ^ "

Q From
wrong lone

j

r-j From wrong
fane

]

a

No signal
No signol

(—] Into wrong
lane

Q

Flashing red

D

Improper bocking

Q

Steady fed

0

Too fast for existing conditions

I

Wrong place

Q

Walk speed

Q fosif

|

Q
Q

Cut in
Across
physical bar

Q Wrong lone

Disobeyed STOP SIGN

Q

So

Improper PASSING

Q At Intersection
0 At ?9d
X walk

FAILURE TO YIELD

Q ?%d

Other violatiom

Cut corner

Q

?l

T3

m p h zone / / ^ ^ "
Q

Q Veh

Q On right

FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY

J
Q

in violation of the (State Statute) (City Ordi nance) in such cose mode and provided
SLIPPERY
PAVEMENT

-°
o —

DARKNESS

•°
w

CAUSED PERSON
TO DODGE

a Ram
D Snow
a ke
D Night
D Fog
D Snow

LJ Pedestrian
Q Onver
D JUST MISSED
ACCIDENT

j

PO D P I O Fatal
Q Ped
0 Veh
i n Hit fixed obi«ct
I L J Right Angle
{

O

£ >
§ S
^

I

(describe)

OTHER TRAFFIC
PRESENT

2

D Cross
nj^€Trvcoming
(_} Ped£}if>an
Pedestrian
ection
Q ^ 5 o m e Dire

Q Industrial
AREA
D Business
HIGHWAY TYPE
Q 2 lone
Q 3 lane

Heod on
Sideswipe
Ran off Rood
Intersection
fend
Residential
Q < lane div«ded

I certify that a copy of this Citation or Information was duly served upon the defendant
according to law on the above date and I know or believe and so allege that the above named
defendant did commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law I further certify that the
court to wnich the defendant has been directed to appea/ is the proper court pursuant to
Section 77 7 21 (SK 77 7 19)
Sworn and subscribed to before me
this

*&?>&•^ - u r ^ v

198.

day of

. Circuit Judge
COURT ABEARANCE

2JL.

^Signature and identification of A
'officer or other complainant) J

day of

ADDRESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE 140 NORTH 1ST WEST LOGAN UTAH
WITHOUT AOMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS OIRECTED HEREIN

d

COURT COPY

Slgna,ure

I
CO

en

STATE OF UTAH

7rz -ists

COUNTY OF CACHE

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE

CASE NO.

CACHE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

3 &H. nO 0 3 - 1 4 -

Name

A456817

CITATION NO.

UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR
(First)

(Last)

(Middle)

/£*4^/
(City)

Address

(State)

Phone

(Zip)

&At4

JUDGE

Place ol Birth

LOCATED AT

/V-

/"U>/£

t ^A-^->^^-7

IN THE ^<jyt^

< ^ / ~

<^~<^

ON OR BEFORE THE

AT THE HOUR OF.

A>^

DAY OF

.. 19.

JP

?.'c^
&

'<*?*^<

A>J/RM.
'^

COURT.

DOB

rtyNunn
Social Securfty
Numbor

HI.

Wt.

Eyos

Hair

Driver License No.
Picture ID

ffiYes

State
hide Color

Race

3^>

C/rcA/
Vehicle Year

Vehicle License No.

Vohicle Make

Stato

Expires

"fr?

Model

TVpo

m

Accidont

D No

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:

X

"¥

V/t

fi*#

X

-A

vt,

Y/-/-/r>

A? (1^, he *-•/*>•

pj±&*>

Misd.
Cit.

Code f

UT | CO I CY

Tral.

K
Ui

FOR COURT USE ONLY
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE

Location

FINE

Date

SUSPENDED

Mil* Post No.
^,

i

JAIL

SUSPENDED

G
D
D
D

PLEA/FINDING
Guilty
No Contest
Not Guilty
Forfeited Bail

SEVERITY
1.1 Minimum
Q] Intermediate
D Maximum

Military Time
19 j

SIGNATURE

Speeding
. In • .

y

WITHOUT ADMITTINQ>6tjXT. I P f OMISJE TO

E W
MRTo^eT

. zone

ERECTED HEREIN:

X6qk##52£^flfe
O-

cJ><^

ID /If.

COMPLAINANT.

DLD
USE

_^J:

Direction
Directu

I CERTIFY THATttDPt OF THIS CITATION O R INFORMATION VWS DULY SERVED UPON THE
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURr TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT
HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19.
OFFICER.

Signature of Judgo or Clork Required

Interstate
G Yei
W No

ID # .

DATE.

MISD. CIT.-BCI
TRAFFIC-COURT

<J

19.
Date Sent to DLD

Docket No.

RIGHT INDEX

UNIFORM CITATION AND
NOTICE TO APPEAR

CITATION N O .

ISSUED
BY:

UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL
(Fir,.)
7\.

N A M E (Lost)
l/TAH

•!

P x STATE OF UTAH

ic$<? AJ- /7<r QfJL

iCi'-

1
Vehicle License N a

U?

Vehicle Yeor

Vehicle Color

ZIP

/
Slate

CITY OF

*'.,-/"* " 'f .

COURT OF

/ "/:

LOCATED AT

,

ON

G^,^

AJ <

/CO

i~J

•

^ ^ - ^ ' ^
(day of week)

THE

/

N o t less fhan (5) five ncx more than (J 4)Tourteen days after iysuonce of
this citation, (see fevp^-.3Hfe-oj_c|e(cncTflpti^copyuJatrJjaiLJfff/eihflc
information).
TUB"—

'

FOR COURT USE ONLY
DATE O F CONVICTION/FORFEITURE
SUSPENDED .

JAIL

SUSPENDED .

PLEA/FINDING

©M

SEVERITY
D

D N o Contest

r-i, ,
•• ,
LJ Intermediate

1

<7/

'//

,
NO:_J_^l___kL

-zrZ-l_£L

MILITARY TIME
MILE POST N O . .

o

. mph in a .

A
s

MPH
OVER

/$"

INTERSTATE:

D YES

urio

STOP S I G N
F

S

WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN:

/

D Guilty

DLD

< ^

Qv)

N i.

SIGNATURE.

FINE

O N o t Guilty
D Forfeited Bail

,19

f-3L
Dt

X-<^CL^

VIOLATION(S): .

Speeding .

jdl**
Aa

-3^

LOCATION

ts

•Jfcw

Jjt

<X^^v

. DAY OF

expires

f

Accident
R
N

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING:
Q-UTAH CODE
• COUNTY CODE
• CITY CODE

THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN:

2H3-2-I

Stale

Type

/9- ^
D

V

5- Z5-.3-C

(Cily)

Driver License Ncv

Q'^COUNTY OF

DOB

\y\n^P

JL

X-^oiV

ADDRESS

B 262294

(Middle)

M i n i

™

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS CITATION OR I N F O R M A T I O N ( S U M M O N S A N D COMPLAINT) W A S DULY SERVED U P O N THE DE
FENDANT A C C O R D I N G TO L A W O N THE ABOVE DATE A N D I K N O W OR BELIEVE A N D SO ALLEGE THAT TME ABOVE N A M E D DEFEN
DANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT Tf IE COURT TO W l IlCH T,
"•» '
DANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPEft COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 7 7 - 7 - 2 1 ( 7 7 - 7 - 1 9 ) .
r

m

O Maximum

OFFICER
DATE

• eL-^-"-"

+-- \sL c
/ '

.BADGE

/ /

, A D . ]? .
DATE SENT TO DLD

DEFENDANT COPY

*

DOCKET N Q

- L03AN

=0URT

DELINQUENT
NOTICE
U t L U ^ U - • -

T0APP6AB

._„^OWTHATVOUHAVEEA,LEOT<

UT84321
- 5 3 - 0 8 =>

OR DEp0SlT

BAIL FOR

TH
—_____^

IMPORTANT

S^SRS^ATE

YABLEJO:

,

^H

r

MICHAEL S
£ 300

WE*'

WLL

SHOWN.

FIRST
CIRCUIT COURT
LFIRST
p.O. Box 2*1
e432i
uT
LOGAN

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
CCUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
LOGAN CITY,

)

I N F O R M A T I O N

Plaintiff

vs.

THATCHER, Michael Stacey
1800 South 2800 West
Logan, Utah

ZFlciisw

Defendant
The undersigned, RICHARD HENDRICKS under oath, states on the
information and belief that the above named Defendant carmitted the
crime (s) of:
SPEEDING (SCHOOL ZONE) (CLASS C MISDEMEANOR)
at Logan, Utah on 12/16/88 in violation of the following sections of the
Revised Ordinances of Logan City:
42/7/1
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts
constituting the offense were:
That the Defendant did drive at a speed greater than was reasonable and
prudent under the conditions and having regards to the actual and
potential hazards then existing namely 33 raph in a 20 mph zone (SCHOOL
ZONE).
Class C Misdemeanor
This information is based on evidence obtained frcm the following
witnesses:
B. FILLMORE, LCPD
Authorized for presentment & filing

Logan C i t y P r o s e c u t o r / A t t o r n e y
DAMAGES:

YES

S u b s c r i b e d & sworn tfo b e f o r e me
t h i s -7 ^ i a y ^ o f ]£fe £_
19^.

/ NO/
CIRCUIT COJRT
OT JUDGE

^

/<t^<£

A~&

23
Chapter 7.
SPEED REGULATIONS
42-7-1
Speed Regulations—Maximum Speeds — School Buildings-intersections, Crossing, and Curves
(a)] No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than
TS reasonabl e_jad prudent under the conditions and having regard to_the
actual and potential hazards then e x i s t i n g
In ewery event speed "shall
be"TcTcbn t r o l l e d as may~be necessary to avoid c o l l i d i n g with any person,
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance w i t h
legal requirements and the duty of a l l persons to use due care
(P^ The following speeds shall be lawful unless otherwise posted
Speeds in excess of the following l i m i t s or i n excess of the posted l i m i t s
shall be prima facie evidence that the speeds are not reasonable and prudent
and that they are unlawful
1.

Twenty miles per hours when passing a school building or
grounds thereof during school recess or while children
are going to or leaving schoot^'during opening and
closing hours

2

Twenty-five miles per hour i n any business, residential
or urban d i s t r i c t inside t h e ^ c i t y l i m i t s of Logan C i t y ,
unless otherwise posted

3

Speeds other than those l i s t e d in subparagraphs 1 and
and 2 above may be allowed w i t h i n the corporate l i m i t s
of Logan City whenever i t T-S determined upon the basis
of an engineering and t r a f f i c investigation that the speed
permitted by law is more or less than is necessary f o r the
safe operation of the vehicles thereon
Any such chance
in speeds shall be posted by properly erected signs giving
notice thereof

—4—"Speed l i m i t s on state highways w i t h i n the c i t y l i m i t s
be as posted by the state

shall

42-7-2
Driving Too Slow
No person shall drive a motor
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable
movement of t r a f f i c except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation
in compllance with law
42-7-3
Speed or Acceleration^ Contests
No person shall drive
a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede or block the normal and
reasonable movement of t r a f f i c except when reduced speed is necessary f o r
safe operation in compliance with law
42-7-4
Obstruction f o r E x h i b i t i o n Forbidden
No person shall
for the purpose of f a c i l i t a t i n g , aiding or as an incident to any vehicle
s
Peed contest or vehicle acceleration contest in any manner obstruct or
Place any barricade or obstruction or a s s i s t or p a r t i c i p a t e in placing any
su
ch barricade or obstruction upon any s t r e e t or a l l e y
(CHAPTER 7 AMENDED 9/23/82)

P*.se. A-?

24
^b-v

Boulevard - Between 200 East and the Intersection of
600 East and ^00 North *
Main Street - Between 400 South and 700 North
600 West - Between 900 Nortn and 2QCftouth
Southwest Street - Between Three Point Avenue and 300 South
Park Avenue - Between South City Limits and Southwest Street
800 East - Between 900 North and 1000 North
1000 West - Between South City Limits and 300 South
300 South - Main Street to 400 East

V

3L. 35 m.p.h. on the following streets'
\ 600 West - Between 900 North and 1500 North
1400 North - Between Main Street and 600 West

4. 40 m.p.h. on the following streets:
^ 4 0 0 North - Between Main Street and 1200 East
^ S M a i n Street - Between South City Limits and 400 South and
Between 700 North and 1100 Horth
800 East - Between 1000 North and North City Limits
1400 North - Between Pain Street and 1500 East
1000 West - Between 200 North and 1400 North
1400 North - Between 1000 liest and 630 West
_5s, 50 m p.h. on the following streets*
\ Ma i n Street - Between 1100 North and 'lo^th City Limits
Highway 89 - Between 1200 East and East City Limits
&/ 55 m.p.h. on the following street
y
\ 200 North - Between 600 West and West City Limit
42-7-2.

Driving Too Slow.

No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed as to imoede
or block the normal and reasonaole movement of traffic except when reduced
speed is necessary for safe operation in compliance with law.
42-7-4.

Speed or Acceleration Contests.

No person shall engage in any motor vehicle speed contest, or in any motor
^icle acceleration contest on any street or alley, and no person shall aid
•^abet any such vehicle SDeed contest or acceleration contest on any street
r
alley.
42-7-4.

Obstruction for Exhibition Forbidden.

No person shall for the purpose of facilitating, aiding
«ny Vehicle speed contest or v e m c l e acceleration contest
r
' uct or place any barricade or obstruction or assist or
M
ng any such barricade or obstruction upon any street or

or as an incident
in ary manner
participate in
alley.

( S E C . 42-7-1 A M E N D E D 12/17/31,
SEC. 42-7-4 AMENDED

fk*e. A'/P

12/3/81)

